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The Affect of Violence

In the summer of 2016 a North Miami police officer shoots a black man lying on his back with his hands raised. The man is Charles Kinsey, a behavioral therapist. So far, this would seem to be an example of the all-too-common occurrence of racialized police violence in the contemporary United States. Yet next to Kinsey sits his autistic client, Arnaldo Eliud Rios Soto, also a person of color, who is holding a toy truck. Kinsey was shot as he was bringing Rios Soto back to the group "home" from which he had escaped. When the police were first called, it was Rios Soto who was believed to be dangerous by the caller, who reported seeing him "holding something like a gun." The story becomes even more layered: conflicting reports about whom the officer had attempted to shoot drew attention from disability communities: was the officer targeting the black man lying on the ground, unarmed and with his hands raised, or the autistic man holding a toy truck next to him? Both possibilities might be connected to much longer histories of racialization, affectivity, and disablement, but their coalescence in this violent instance of racialized, able-nationalist arrangements of power speaks to the importance of thinking about the co-constitution of race and disability in the *longue durée* of racial capitalism and liberal modernity.[1]

Questions of intensity and excess are at the heart of the interlinked processes of racialization and disablement, often produced through the interplay of rationality and affect. Police forces were established to protect owners at a time when black people were considered unruly property, when indigenous people and other people of color, women, and people with disabilities were construed as "irrational" others against which liberal personhood was constructed. The ongoingness of racialized police violence extends this history and continues to assign to social death and literal death those deemed irrational, unruly, unstable, and unpredictable.[2] To draw from Alexander Weheliye's recent work on Hortense Spillers's hieroglyphics of the flesh, the "enfleshed" are the foundations on which Western Enlightenment's political, social, and scientific models

have been constructed, and continue to bear its burden even as their embodied and cognitive unruliness resists "the legal idiom of personhood as property."[3] When we revisit the affects of enfleshment and the history of racialization and disablement, we open new paths to understanding the "nastiness" of our current moment.[4]

In grappling with this "nastiness," one could invoke the all-too-ubiquitous statistics about the overlap of mental illness and incarceration, about the increased likelihood of police violence directed at autistic or otherwise neurodivergent people of color, but we would like to especially attend to the origins of that violence. How might we think about not only the specific *acts* of violence inflicted on Kinsey and Rios Soto during the police encounter that "disabled" both men (and which led Rios Soto to be re-incarcerated in a residential institution) while also attending to the state-sanctioned and other *structural* forms of violence that preceded and surround this event? We may never know why Rios Soto tried to escape from the group home he was living in, but it is worth wondering what parts of a residential setting make it into a "home" to begin with. Taking up the kind of critical disability and mad studies frameworks we are calling for in this forum, how might we understand the forms of incarceration and other modes of social control at play in this event as imbricated with other forms of state violence, and as linked to enduring ontological erasures—of mad or neurodivergent or disabled modes of subjectivity—that saturate the scene of this violence?

Understanding the interrelated processes of racialization and criminal-pathologization must therefore lead to a more complex and nuanced discussion of alternatives to incarceration. Black Lives Matter has brought renewed attention to long-standing debates about alternatives to policing and incarceration. The basic questions posed in these discussions is what to do when we are harmed instead of calling the police, and what structures can be put in place to encourage greater community and personal accountability, leading to more just and inclusive social arrangements. One important example that draws attention to this is the statement issued by the Harriet Tubman Collective calling attention to the omission of people with disabilities (of color) from the Platform for Black Lives.[5] What does it mean to imagine liberation so broadly and radically (as the platform surely does) without incorporating the perspective or imagined reality and futures of people with disabilities, who make up, by many accounts, over half of those killed by police in the last few years?[6]

While it is crucial to call attention to the high numbers of disabled people, especially black disabled people and disabled people of color, implicated by

state violence and carceral systems, including policing, our point is also to reveal how state violence and carcerality are themselves disability and mad issues: from the disposability of mad subjects and populations and their susceptibility to premature death (Ruth Wilson Gilmore's definition of racism); to understanding the nature of systems of capture and exclusion as disabling; to discussions of alternatives to these systems.[7] It is about understanding the constructions of pathologization and dangerousness within racial capitalism, the entanglement of white supremacy with processes of both criminalization and disablement (constructing people as other, as deranged, crazy, illogical, unfathomable, scary, inhuman) that lead to segregation and annihilation.[8] Liberal reformists frequently say that people with disabilities (especially those with mental difference) or addiction issues caught up in the criminal injustice system need medical treatment rather than punitive incarceration. But what is often touted as treatment and medical care is no less coercive and normalizing than other forms of incarceration.[9]

The Violence of Theory

This is where mad studies and mad epistemologies come in. We want to understand "correction" (and we use the word intentionally) as a distinct mode of *carceral ableism*.[10] Indeed, such an account of carceral ableism is just one example of the kind of critical vantage that might be made possible by this forum, which seeks to bring attention to current research taking place at the conjunction of American studies, affect theory, and the emerging interdisciplinary field of "critical mad studies." The nascent field of mad studies draws on decades of scholarship and activism examining how psychiatric disabilities or differences must be understood not only as medical conditions but also as historical formations that have justified all manner of ill-treatment and disenfranchisement—even as they have also formed the basis for political identities, social movements, and cultural practices of resistance.

Many of the most urgent issues that are addressed in American studies scholarship—across disciplines, methodologies, and historical periods—are profoundly bound up in the deep historical, social, and political contingencies that determine what the early twentieth-century German sociologist Georg Simmel called "mental life."[11] Yet sustained attention to the experiences and critical perspectives of explicitly self-nominating "mad" subjects, movements, and discourses has been notably absent from American studies' field imaginaries. This absence has shaped what we would characterize as an overlooked

concurrence of ableist *and* sanist bias and oversight within American studies scholarship—even as the field (at least since the rise of the so-called New American studies beginning in the late 1980s) has implicitly aligned itself with justice movements that aim to make previously excluded, marginalized, and pathologized groups and subjects representable within the historical archive of (and critical discourse about) the Americanist project.[12]

Yet "madness" remains a slippery and unruly object in such contexts: perhaps more acutely than other marginalized identity knowledges, the "object" at the core of the emerging discourse of critical mad studies seems to brim with especially unruly, errant, contradictory, and even perverse potentialities. To even speak of a *mad studies* is to bring together terms that in some ways are diametrically opposed: the word *studies* implicitly evokes inherited ideals of rational inquiry, reasoned observation, and shared academic conventions that continue to undergird what Spillers has termed the "studies protocols" that govern the contemporary academic landscape. As Spillers writes, "It is not customary that a studies protocol discloses either its provenance or its whereabouts. By the time it reaches us, it has already acquired the sanction of repetition, the authority of repression, and the blessings of time and mimesis so that, effectually, such a protocol now belongs to the smooth and natural ordering of the cultural."[13] Madness would seem not merely to disrupt such sanctioned ideals but in fact to constitute the definitional "outside," the external limit, of the "studies protocol" itself. Indeed, disability studies scholars like Margaret Price and Mel Chen have noted that to study madness requires pushing up against, and thereby exposing, the limits of the protocols of academic practice, including both research and pedagogy.[14]

We are convinced that an emergent critical mad studies can offer not just useful but necessary insight into the ways in which variations in the psychic, cognitive, and affective dimensions of experience are parceled out into categories such as normal and pathological, healthy and sick, able and disabled, or permissible and criminal—all under the supposedly "empirical" authority of medical science and psychiatric expertise as much as through the exercise of legal and juridical power. Ongoing debates within medical and scientific communities surrounding the definition and etiology of mental disorders evince the still profoundly unsettled and contested status of madness. Critical mad studies takes as axiomatic that the meaning and experience of madness and mental illness is shaped by the complex historical, social, and political contingency of what has come to be called "psychiatric power" (and what some of our contributors refer to as "psy" disciplines, complexes, professions, industries, and epistemologies).[15]

The controversies stirred up by each successive edition of the American Psychological Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* can be understood as the ripple effects of the dramatic transformations in the scientific and cultural status of "mental illness"—and subjects diagnosed as mentally ill or disabled—that have taken place, along many dimensions, since World War II. Shifts in the scientific and medical definition of mental illness are inseparable from contemporaneous transformations in the realm of mental health social policy over the past half-century, which has involved both the gradual "deinstitutionalization" of large, state-run psychiatric facilities and the decimation of public support for mental health research and "community-based" treatment programs that were supposed to take their place. The proliferation of new and ever more gradated diagnostic disorders and the explosive expansion of the psychopharmacology industry (signaled in popular discourse by terms like *Prozac Nation*) have additionally contributed to what might be characterized as an expansive and far-reaching "biomedicalization" (and, increasingly, neuro-biomedicalization) of psychic life over the past several decades.[16] At the same time, these shifts have taken place alongside concomitant transformations in the mechanisms of criminalization, largely along racial lines.[17] The dire cumulative effects of these interwoven historical processes—especially on racialized populations—is suggested by the often-repeated (if problematically simplistic) axiom that the prison system has become the United States' primary recourse for dealing with mental/psychiatric difference.[18]

Disability studies and mad studies take as their major premise the idea that "normal," "average," or "able" are all socially and culturally contingent designations.[19] Such processes have variously been identified as forms of handicapism (Bogdan and Biklen), ableism (Campbell), normalcy (Davis), compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer), disablement (Oliver), and more recently debility (Livingston; Puar), and in mad studies the emphasis is on sanism or mentalism (Chamberlin, Perlin).[20] With this forum, we hope to show the ways in which critical mad studies can reveal how enduring "macropolitical" systems, structures, and historical processes articulate with the "micropolitical" dimensions of subjectivity, embodiment, and psychic experience. Disability and mad cultures offer powerful alternative narratives about disablement, madness, and the vagaries of mental life. Not everything disability or madness produces is beautiful, but as a productive force, disability generates specific sensibilities, discourses, and affects. Just as disability justice movements and disability studies scholars have sought to counter narratives of deficit and loss by turning to models of "disability gain,"[21] in this forum we explore what might be gained

as scholars and activists by attending to madness otherwise. What can we learn by turning to the energies and commitments that have fueled the psychiatric survivors' movement, "mad pride," radical therapy, neurodiversity, and disability culture/rights/studies? These discourses resist medicalization and the authority of medical/psychiatric expertise; they counter narratives of cure, and many insist on access, social justice, and cultural recognition of madness and mental difference as an intrinsic aspect of human variation.[22]

Theory of Affect

This forum traces its origins to a roundtable, "Affect Theory Meets Mad Studies," that took place at the 2015 American Studies Association conference, one of the first panels to be sponsored by the ASA's then newly reconstituted Critical Disability Studies Caucus (CDSC). In responding to the ASA's notably "affective" orientation within its recent conference themes—from the "pleasure and pain" of 2014 to the "misery" of 2015—members of the CDSC felt the need to address the often-unmarked ableist potential of such keywords, which have too often led to the centering of privileged affective states. With this panel the caucus sought "to trouble the ways that mental illness is theorized and employed without consideration for the lived reality of an ableist and sanist society" (as noted in the original panel description). Since affective registers are distributed unevenly among those who bear them, both the panel and this subsequent forum emphasize the situational differences of affect under racial capitalist settler colonialism. That year's ASA conference's location in Toronto, Canada—known internationally as a hub of antipsychiatry and mad activism / mad studies work—further confirmed the importance of centering hemispheric and transnational perspectives that could invite critical engagements with the differential developments of mad studies and antipsychiatry activism, which has until recently been quite pronounced in Canada and rather more lacking in the US academy.[23]

More specifically, contributors to this forum address madness, mental illness, and psychiatric disability by engaging with the wider, cross-disciplinary attention to the politics of affect and emotion that has surfaced over the past several decades. In light of affect theory's ongoing importance within the far-reaching theoretical challenges to models of liberal subjectivity, settler colonial sociality, and racial capitalist knowledge production that have defined American studies scholarship in recent years, this forum offers urgent engagements with (and at times critiques of) discrete traditions and genealogies of affect theory

by insisting on the necessity of critical disability and mad studies perspectives to these debates.

Affect theory draws on and engages many of the same concerns as disability and mad studies, including the complex cultural and clinical legacies of psychoanalytic theory, trauma studies, post-structuralism, posthumanism, and the current transition from the linguistic to the somatic turn, but so far there has been little dialogue between these fields. There is a shared interest in challenging the Cartesian dualism of bodyminds, a strong investment in grappling with the old and new materialisms, and a desire to engage the sciences and philosophy in order to expand our understanding of bodyminds as they are situated within force fields of object relations, social structures, and historically charged yet locally specific political economies. Two of the most prominent intellectual trajectories within contemporary affect theory—those associated with Brian Massumi (via Gilles Deleuze and Baruch Spinoza) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (via Silvan Tomkins)—theorize terms like *virtuality*, *embodiment*, and *affect* itself through strategic engagements with cognitive science and neuroscience. Though in divergent ways, these theoretical itineraries mobilize insights from the "mind sciences" of recent decades in order to challenge the liberal mythos of the autonomous, willful, and "rational" self.[24] Yet the critical uptake of affect theory has often unwittingly reconstituted the body–mind dualism that disability and mad studies scholarship and activism have productively challenged. For instance, the "return" to the body and its materiality frequently associated with affect theory's much-vaunted efforts to point beyond rational, "intentionalist" models of the subject (often in favor of an emphasis on the "pre-conscious" or "nonconscious" sensations) have too often entirely skirted the very problem and historical contingency of ideas about rational "intentionality" itself.[25] How might these theoretical impasses and oversights be worked through by centering, instead of an implicitly normative bodymind, the mad or otherwise pathologized subject?

Additionally, as many of this forum's contributors note, in its attempts to move beyond liberal models of subjectivity and autonomy, affect theory too often overlooks (or takes for granted) the fractured and uneven historical positionalities and experiences of those who were never considered human and are still not treated as such. In centering "madness," this forum not only turns its attention to those who do not, according to José Esteban Muñoz, "feel quite right within the protocols of normative affect and comportment" but also insists that the policing and pathologization of normative affect is produced by historical processes of racialization, settler colonialism, and heteronormative

able-nationalism.[26] Augmenting the invaluable contributions of affect theory to the project of American studies, our contributors approach their various topics of inquiry from a different angle—asking how critical disability and mad studies perspectives compel us to revisit what Lawrence Grossberg describes as affect theory's essential emphasis on "the notion of a gap between what can be rendered meaningful or knowable and what is nevertheless livable."[27]

As the contributors to this forum discuss across a diverse range of contexts, the various (often concomitant) processes of medicalization and criminalization through which particular emotional and affective states, experiences, or modes of behavior have been pathologized as "mad" or "mentally ill" call for a scholarly approach that is as attentive to the politics of affect as it is to the historically contingent meanings of madness and disability. The forum thus features scholarship that troubles the ways in which madness, mental illness, and psychiatric disability have been studied without consideration for the lived reality of an ablesanist social order. In grappling with these questions, we have endeavored to address affect theory's lacunae through what the disability studies scholar Jina Kim has termed "crip of color" perspectives and reading practices.[28] Indeed, many of the contributors to the forum build on earlier interventions by queer of color critique and critical race theory in order to call attention to the ways in which affect theory (and academic projects across disciplines that employ its terms) has all too often conceptualized emotions, feelings, and affects—and the social relations they index—in able-bodyminded terms.[29] Through this approach, the forum highlights the historically structuring roles of racial, gendered, and sexual difference within the implicitly able-bodyminded logics of liberal (and neoliberal) rationality and its affective correlates.

The Forum

The forum offers a wide range of interventions both on a theoretical and on a methodological level, as well as within and across disciplines and interdisciplinary fields. As editors, we have not enforced one specific understanding of affect, disability, or psychiatric experience, in the hope that the plurality of perspectives will foster a truly engaging discussion. The forum opens with La Marr Jurelle Bruce's alternative genealogy of the co-constituted concepts of racial blackness and madness: juxtaposing the slave ship with Michel Foucault's "ship of fools," Bruce encourages scholars to adopt a "mad methodology" in conversation with key insights from critical race theory and black cultural production. Rachel Gorman extends Bruce's insights by bringing a race-centered

critical disability/mad studies into conversation with affect theory, addressing the occlusion of recentered whiteness within current debates about affect. Gorman argues for the productivity of historical materialist methodologies that remain committed to an analysis of racial capitalism and settler colonialism in understanding the differentially experienced affective registers of "mad" and "sane." Regina Kunzel's essay on gay activism leading to the declassification of homosexuality as a psychological disorder in the early 1970s offers an alternative, historical perspective on the "affectability" of the mad subject. Kunzel shows how gay activist efforts to depathologize homosexuality were articulated through a politics of health that contributed to the further stigmatization of psychiatric disabilities. Kunzel's analysis offers a powerful case study of the way political projects of liberal inclusion have placed race and sexuality in tension with disability and mental pathology.

Jasper Verlinden offers a crip of color critique of earlier psycho-medical discourses that sought to establish knowledge claims by way of recentering white "normality." These neuroscientific racial projects have uncritically become incorporated into affect theory's racialized and ableist undercurrents, most prominently in the work of Brian Massumi. Zach Richter's essay on "mad data" argues for the rich potential of psychiatric survivor knowledge in light of the embodied practices cultivated by mad subjects, groups, and communities. Jijian Voronka builds on Richter's focus on the psy disciplines by investigating how the affective labor of peer support workers becomes co-opted in the dominant mental health service system. Voronka's acute analysis of how neoliberal health care regimes co-opt peer-support workers' affective labor returns to the question of the limits of inclusion, liberal personhood, and normative citizenship when it comes to the clinical treatment of mad subjects.

Finally, Louise Tam extends Voronka's insights about the role of affect in medical encounters by discussing the antiblackness that remains at the core of mental health systems, especially as they intersect with settler colonialism, detention and deportation systems, and immigration policy. Tam's perceptive and timely analysis of the co-constitution of race and madness reveals the contemporary persistence of the historical processes and concerns with which the forum opens.

"Mad Futures" goes to press at a perilous moment. Critical attention to the violences that undergird normalizing regimes of power, it seems, has never been more fiercely urgent. The impetus to police, surveil, imprison, control, and normalize particularly marked bodyminds is always bound up with ableist and saneist forms of erasure and death. Yet with the virulent resurgence of

right-wing populism, cultural nationalism, and the specter of fascism on the US political scene and across the globe, it is more important than ever to attend to the differential psychic toll that these processes exert—particularly as modes of domination that were previously unthinkable or at least unspeakable have now been normalized and neutralized as forms of free "expression" within a liberal framework of rights. Discourses across the political spectrum continue to uncritically make recourse to the vocabulary of madness and mental illness to explain and "make sense of" individual acts and modes of behavior. Efforts to assign mental "diagnoses" to the murderous acts of Anders Breivik or Omar Mateen, the "erratic" and "impulsive" speech of Donald Trump, or various practices of political resistance or social nonconformity have real, deleterious consequences: they distract our attention from the *structural* forms of violence and dispossession that give rise to actions and behaviors retroactively deemed "crazy." Just as importantly, we believe that the field of American studies must stay vigilantly focused on the psychic and affective costs of normalizing violence while remaining attentive to the vastly uneven ways in which these costs are distributed and experienced. Only then might the "mad futures" that this forum's contributors collectively help us envision come more fully into view.

Notes

We would like to acknowledge the fierce mad-identified activists, scholars, and communities who continue to imagine mad futures. We also thank the American Studies Association's Critical Disability Studies Caucus, as well as the editors and Editorial Board of *American Quarterly*, for creating generative spaces that have facilitated this project.

1. In general, the terms *disabled people* and *disablism* are preferred by those who emphasize the social model of disability and are the dominant terms used in the UK. Michael Oliver, *Understanding Disability: From Theory to Praxis* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996). Those who emphasize rights frameworks tend to use *people with disabilities* and *ableism*; this usage is more common in the United States. Dan Goodley, *Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010); and A. J. Withers, *Disability Politics and Theory* (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2012). Some scholars, however, differentiate between ableism and disablism: ableism, like normalcy, is shaped according to the imagined ideal of "the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human" that we are all measured against and thus refers not only to the specific forms of oppression that disabled people experience (Fiona A. Kumari Campbell, "Exploring Internalized Ableism Using Critical Race Theory," *Disability & Society* 23.2 [2008]: 44; also A. J. Withers et al., "Radical Disability Politics: A Roundtable," in *Routledge Handbook of Radical Politics*, ed. R. Kinna, and U. Gordon [New York: Routledge, forthcoming]).
2. Lisa Maria Cacho, *Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected* (New York: New York University Press, 2012).
3. Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 44.

4. Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 193, quoting Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed, 1983), 442.
5. Harriet Tubman Collective, "Disability Solidarity: Completing the 'Vision for Black Lives,'" September 14, 2016, harriettubmancollective.tumblr.com/post/150415348273/disability-solidarity-completing-the-vision-for.
6. Ruderman Family Foundation, "Ruderman White Paper," March 8, 2016, www.rudermanfoundation.org/blog/in-the-media/media-missing-the-story-half-of-all-recent-high-profile-police-related-killings-are-people-with-disabilities.
7. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman, and Allison C. Carey, eds., *Disability Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
8. For more on the intersectional of criminalization, racialization, and pathologization go to Jin Haritaworn, "Beyond 'Hate': Queer Metonymies of Crime, Pathology, and Anti/Violence," *Jindal Global Law Review* 4 (2013): 44–78.
9. Erick Fabris, *Tranquil Prisons: Chemical Incarceration under Community Treatment Orders* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).
10. In her upcoming book (tentatively titled *Politics of (En)closure: Disability, Deinstitutionalization, and Prison Abolition*), Liat Ben-Moshe coins the term "carceral ableism" to connote the confluence of ableism and carceral logics.
11. Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *The Blackwell City Reader*, ed. Gary Bridhe and Sophie Watson (London: Wiley, 2010), 103–10.
12. Donald E. Pease, "New Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon," *boundary 2* 17.1 (1990): 1–37. For a rigorous discussion of American studies' shifting "field imaginaries" and the justice projects with which these shifts align, see Robyn Wiegman, *Object Lessons* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 197–238.
13. Hortense Spillers, "Introduction: Peter's Pans: Eating in the Diaspora," in *Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3.
14. Margaret Price, *Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); and Mel Y. Chen, "Brain Fog: The Race for Cripistemology," *Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies* 8.2 (2014): 171–84.
15. For a thorough account of mad studies in relationship to the history of the "psy" disciplines, see Brenda A. LeFrançois, Robert Menzies, and Geoffrey Reaume, "Introducing Mad Matters," in *Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies,* ed. Brenda A. LeFrançois, Robert Menzies, and Geoffrey Reaume (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2013). In his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1970s, Michel Foucault offers a genealogy of "psychiatric power" that traces its emergence to the nineteenth-century development of disciplinary institutions, techniques of control, and regimes of governmentality over madness in Western Europe that came to be defined by "a positive technique of intervention and transformation." Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–75,* ed. Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003); and Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974,* ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2006).
16. Elizabeth Wurtzel, *Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America* (New York: Penguin, 1994); Bradley Lewis, *Moving beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New Psychiatry: The Birth of Postpsychiatry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010); Nikolas S. Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Nikolas S. Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, *Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Teresa Ebert, *The Task of Cultural Critique* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009).
17. Eg., Jonathan M. Metzl, *The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease* (Boston: Beacon, 2010).
18. Liat Ben-Moshe, "Why Prisons Are Not the New Asylums," in *Punishment and Society* (forthcoming).
19. Feminist and critical analysis of disability brought to the forefront a new conceptualization of disability, not just as a socially excluded category, but as an embodied identity; cf., e.g., Susan Wendell, *The*

Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (New York: Routledge, 1996); Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). However, one major critique of such an enterprise is the concern of the overrepresentation of the body and visible disabilities in disability studies. When scoping the canonical works of what has come to be called disability studies, there is little focus on cognitive, developmental, learning, and psychiatric disabilities.

20. Robert Bogdan and Douglas Biklen, "Handicapism," *Social Policy* 7.5 (1977): 14–19; Fiona Kumari Campbell, *Contours of Ableism* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Lennard J. Davis, *Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body* (New York: Verso, 1995); Robert McRuer, *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability* (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Michael Oliver, *The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Julie Livingston, *Debility and the Moral Imaginatin in Botswana* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009); Jasbir K. Puar, "Coda: The Cost of Getting Better: Suicide, Sensation, Switchpoints," *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 18.1 (2012): 149–58; Michael L. Perlin, "On Sanism," *SMU Law Review* 46 (1993): 373–407; Judy Chamberlin, *On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1978).
21. Most notably, many in these movements share goals of fighting for "re-symbolization" and meaning; Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory," *NWSA Journal* 14.3 (2002): 1–31. For instance, these fields share a process by which terminology such as "crip" and "mad" have been reclaimed and reaffirmed as legitimate, not to mention chic, identity formations as opposed to diagnostic labels that signal lack and pathology; B. Lewis, "A Mad Fight: Psychiatry and Disability Activism," in *The Disability Studies Reader*, ed. Lennard Davis (New York: Routledge, 2006). Thus, within these movements, the disabled/psychiatrized identity is seen either in a matter of fact way or as a valued identity one possesses, in a similar vein to queer identities or the new concept of "deaf gain" as opposed to "hearing loss" within Deaf Culture; D. Bauman and S. Murray, "Reframing: From Hearing Loss to Deaf Gain," *Deaf Studies Digital Journal* 1.1 (2009).
22. While many strands within these movements still engage in rights discourses, there is much contention about the concept of rights and its effectiveness; Michael Gill and Cathy J. Schlund-Vials, eds., *Disability, Human Rights, and the Limits of Humanitarianism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014).
23. Brenda A. LeFrançois, Robert Menzies, and Geoffrey Reaume, eds., *Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2013).
24. Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).
25. Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect: A Critique," *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 434–72.
26. José Esteban Muñoz, "Feeling Brown, Feeling Down," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31.3 (2006): 676; Sara Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Mel Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Kyla Wazana Tomkins, "On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy," *Lateral* 5.1 (2016): csalateral.org/wp/issue/5-1/forum-alt-humanities-new-materialist-philosophy-tompkins/; Cynthia Wu, "Animating Contemporary Culture," *Transgender Studies Quarterly* 1.3 (2014): 445–48.
27. Lawrence Grossberg, "Affect's Future: Rediscovering the Virtual in the Actual," in *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 318.
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29. We refer to able "bodyminded" as opposed to able-bodied to denote the centrality of nonphysical aspects of dis/ability, which are often left out or get hidden in discussions of able-bodied privilege or oppression.